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ABSTRACT
State governments such as Massachusetts that seek to preserve
and revitalize agriculture have a multitude of national and
regional constraints to overcome to effectively reach this
objective. How effective has the Massachusetts' Agricultural
Preservation Restriction Program, the backbone of the
Commonwealth'-s agricultural preservation effort been at
preserving and revitalizing agriculture?
Using the program's objectives, and goals, and accounting for
political and economic constraints we conclude the program has
been successful. It has created an affordable land market for
farmers, spurred re-investment in protected farms, and
distributed benefits fairly and wisely. However the program
has tended to attract farmers at the margins of economic
profitability. It has bought some time and the opportunity to
make agriculture viable in Massachusetts. Agricultural
viability will only come with the restructuring of the
economics of farming in Massachusetts and the northeastern
United States.
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CHAPTER ONE
PRESERVING LOCAL AGRICULTURE:
THE BUCZALA, BRESSE, AND BOURGESI FARMS
It's a warm April day and I'm speaking with George
Buczala because his farm is part of the Agricultural
Preservation Restriction program (APR) the major Massachusetts
program to preserve farmland. Somehow we're off discussing
Mr. Buczala's life in farming, the trends in U.S.
agriculture, the future of dairying, and everything but the
APR program. Maybe, I decide, as I take in the beauties of
Mr. Buczala's Connecticut Valley farm, you need to discuss why
preserve local and regional agriculture at all before
describing, analyzing, and generally pontificating about
agricultural preservation. But as I try to steer Mr. Buczala
back toward the question of "why", I realize that for him
it's not a matter for discussion. He has lived on farms all
of his life from his childhood on his father's
tobacco/potato/dairy farm to his adult and senior years on his
own dairy farm. If George Buczala does not easily discuss the
existence of Massachusetts agriculture in theory, it's because
working the land has been his life.
My goal here in discussing the reasons to preserve
agriculture is to focus on non-economic and powerful reasons
to preserve agriculture that connect with other important
political and spiritual questions. Farmland preservation has
received support both in Massachusetts, and in other states
for what I believe are two fundamental reasons.
First, food is survival. We may trust "the market" to
2get us typewriters, cars, and computers, but it rubs our
instinct wrong to lose all semblance of food self sufficiency.
The logic of the market (cheap oil, large capital, tax policy)
dictates that 90% of our food "should" be grown in distant
places such as Florida and California. As this food
dependence is relatively recent, (post World War II) citizens
need to be made aware of this situation so that they can
decide if they are comfortable with the loss of food
production capability in the Northeast. Many will not be and
will support programs that aid local farmers and provide food
insurance.
The second reason for supporting farmland preservation is
that people are concerned with maintaining a connection to
the past, when human activity, and land itself were not bought
and sold as commodities. By doing this we are creating a
future in which land and labor will not be treated as
commodities. Karl Polyani, an Austrian economist traces the
rise of the industrial capitalist system and its ideology of
the "free market" in his classic bookThe Great Transformation.
But labor, land, and money are obviously not
commodities; the postulate that anything that is bought
and sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically
untrue in regard to them. In other words according to
the empirical definition of a commodity they are not
commodities. Labor is only another name for a human
activity which goes with life itself, which in its turn
is not produced for sale bus for entirely different
reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest
of life, be stored or mobilized; land is only another
name for nature, which is not produced by man.. .1
Polyani goes on to discuss land specifically:
The economic function is but one of many vital
functions of land. It invests man's life with stability;
it is the site of his habitation; it is a condition of
3his physical safety; it is the landscape and the seasons.
We might as well imagine his being born without hands and
feet as carrying on his life without land.2
The farmer represents our social yearning to reach back
to, (and break through to) a time when human labor and nature
itself were not primarily treated as commodities. He does
not punch in the clock at eight o'clock and leave at five. He
uses skill and endeavor to interact with a force more powerful
than humans: nature. As such, the farmer stands as one of our
strongest symbols of free and creative labor. By retaining
agriculture in our region and state we are doing more than
creating a series of economically beneficial reactions. We
are preserving our connection with nature, and our past; we
are creating a future in which land and labor will be
respected for their inherent value.
George Buczala is happy that his farm is part of the
Agricultural Preservation Restriction program. Under the
program farms sell the state of Massachusetts their
"development rights" or literally their legal right to sell
their land for real estate development. The 135 acre Buczala
dairy farm is quite productive. It is located in the
Connecticut River Valley, the area with the best tarmland in
Massachusetts--which is why the state was interested in the
farm. Mr. Buczala wanted to be on the program because the
land would be permanently saved and he would get a significant
amount of money. Using appraisal methods Mr. Buczala's
development rights were valued at $125,000 ($925 per acre),
and on May 4, 1983, they were purchased for this amount.3
Three years later the farm is as the Buczala's say "still
4there" but is in a difficult financial situation through no fault
of the family's. Its problems have to do with the national
milk market, and its distressed long term trends of
overproduction and low prices. George Buczala's son Linwood
is already a 50% owner in the farm and wants to continue
farming, but is discouraged by the long hours, constant work
(365 days a year) and extremely low returns. The Buczala's
are hoping that diversification to other farming activities
will help. Despite the major financial problems in the dairy
market they are trying to keep farming.
The Bresse farm in southeastern Massachusetts, one of the
last farms left in Rayhnam, is also on the APR program. John
Bresse is in his mid eighties. He and his wife Winifred
retired from the dairy business in 1974.. In December of 1982
the Bresse's sold the development rights on their 64 acres to
the state for $55,175 ($860 per acre).4 The land is being
maintained, but is not very productive, because Mr. Bresse has
not put fertilizer on his hayfields for eleven years. The
Bresse's are glad their land is not going to end up in
houselots, since they have owned the farm for over fifty
years. The Bresse's want the land to end up in the hands of an
active farmer. Although there are a few market garderners
interested in parcels of the land, it is unclear what will
happen to the farm. The agricultural preservation restricts
development and requires an agricultural use; it can't ensure
that farms like the Bresse's won't end up as the playtoy of a
"gentleman farmer".
The Bourgesi farm in northeastern Massachusetts--
5Metheun--is also an APR farm, but is quite different than
either the Buczala or Bresse farms. Salvadore Bourgesi in his
mid sixties is in the process of turning his vegetable farm
over to his son. He sold development rights on his 54 acres
to the Commonwealth for $509,000 ($9,425 per acre) in
September of 1981.5 The Bourgesi's and their eighteen
employees grow eggplants, peppers, tomatoes, zucchini,
cabbage, and cucumbers in large quantities. The farm is one
of the most productive on the program, and ranks with a
handful of vegetable farms in the state. Mr Bourgesi usually
produces 50,000 bushels of vegetables a season. Roughly
speaking that is 1,650,000 pounds of produce!
Mr. Bourgesi too is a supporter of the APR program, and
is basically satisfied that he sold his development rights to
the state. He reinvested the $509,000 he received in a
variety of ways to improve the farm. This included buying
four new tractors, building a packing house, buying an
electric jack, and perhaps most importantly buying his
brother's share of the farm. Despite the $10,000 per acre
received for the development rights to his land, Mr. Bourgesi
feels he should have been paid more. He believes that the
market price was closer to $15,000 per acre when he sold to
the state. If he could sell that land development today he
believes the price would be about $50,000 per acre. This is
five times the maximum the state has paid (on a per acre
basis) for any land on the APR program.
The varying circumstances between the Buczala, Bresseand
Bourgesi farms raise many questions about the APR progam and
6state policy to preserve agriculture. To evaluate how
effectively the APR program has preserved farmland and
revitalized agriculture in Massachusetts requires looking at
state agricultural decline in its geographical and historical
context (Chapter Two), and understanding some of the
agricultural preservation prog.rams available to state
governments (Chapter Three). In Chapter Four we examine the
APR program's objectives, and dilemmas it faces in striving to
reach.them. Chapter Five is an in depth look at key measures
to see how well the APR program has reached its goals, we
particularily focus on measures for economic viability of
preserved farms. Finally our conclusion ties together this
work with larger political questions on agricultural
preservation developed in this chapter.
My perspective is shaped by four years spent at a food
cooperative wholesaler working directly with farmers and
learning how the marketing system works against the interests
of family farmers. Having the opportunity to work for the
Massachusetts Department of Agriculture, visit the farms on
the APR program and meet the growers last summer laid the
basis for this paper.
7CHAPTER TWO
MASSACHUSETTS AGRICULTURE IN REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
The Bourgesi, Bresse, and Buczala farms are all on the
Massachusetts Agricultural Preservation Restriction program
which has the objective of preserving farmland. This program
was legislated in the late 1970's to counter the decline of
farming in the state, and the conversion of farmland to other
uses. Other states in the Northeastern United States also
experienced this loss of farms, and farmland, and also adopted
policies to preserve their agricultural bases. The problem of
agricultural decline in Massachusetts is best seen in this
context of the overall agricultural decline in the Northeast.
Ultimately, solutions to this agricultural decline will need
to improve the economics of farming for Northeastern growers.
The Northeastern United States includes all six New
England states (Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut), as well as the Mid-Atlantic
states of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware.
What does it mean to say that the Northeastern states have a
common regional role in the U.S. agricultural economy, and
that their efforts to preserve agriculture should be seen
regionally? The area has a common history and geography. All
of these states are contiguous. Furthermore they share a
common soil base and climate. The common history of the
Northeastern states includes early European settlement, heavy
urbanization during the nineteenth century, and
suburbanization during the twentieth century.
8Early settlement in the Northeast in colonial days and
the westward expansion of the U.S. has made the decline of
agriculture a common regional experience. Farmers have moved
for better farming opportunities for many generations. The
Midwest offered these opportunities because of its abundance
of fertile land. For over one hundred years the region has
been in agricultural decline. That is, 1880 was the census
year in which the region peaked in terms of the number of
farms, the total land area in farms, and the percentage of
land area in farms. Not only was 1880 the peak of
agricultural activity for the region as a whole, it was the
peak year for most of these states. Table I and Table II
illustrate this. What's significant is that each of these
states are affected by the same national and international
influences as far as the structure and viability of their
agricultural sector. By 1880 the region had seen the absolute
peak in agricultural activity because the Midwest had a
regional advantage in availability and fertility of land.
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TABLE I THOUSANDS OF
STATE 1850
Maine 46.8
New Hampshire 29.2
Vermont 29.8
Massachusetts 34.1
Rhode Island 5.4
Connecticut 22.4
New York 170.6
New Jersey 23.9
Pennsylvania 127.6
Delaware 6.1
Ten States 495.8
FARMS IN
1880
64.3
32.2
35.5
38.4
6.2
30.6
241.1
34.3
213.5
8.7
704.9
NORTHEASTERN
1910
60.0
27.1
32.7
36.9
5.3
26.8
215.6
33.5
219.3
10.8
668.0
STATES
1940
39.0
16.6
23.6
31.9
3.0
21.2
153.2
25.8
169.0
9.0
492.3
1850-1982
1982
7.0
2.8
6.3
5.4
.7
3.8
42.2
8.3
55.6
3.3
135.4
9Source: U.S.Census of Agriculture and Mark Lapping
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TABLE II TOTAL LAND
STATE 1850.
Maine 4.5
New Hampshire 3.4
Vermont 4.1
Massachusetts 3.4
Rhode Island .6
Connecticut 2.4
New York 19.1
New Jersey 2.7
Pennsylvania 14.9
Delaware 1.0
Ten States 56.1
(MILLIONS
1880
6.5
3.7
4.9
3.4
.3
2.5
23.8
2.9
19.8
1.1
69.1
OF ACRES)
1910
6.3
3.3
4.7
2.9
.4
2.2
22.0
2.6
18.6
1.0
64.0
TEN STATES
1940
4.2
1.8
3.7
1.9
.2
1.5
17.2
1.9
14.6
.9
47.9
1850-1982
1982
1.5
.5
1.6
.6
.1
.4
9.2
.9
8.3
.7
23.8
The post World War II period was a time of major economic
expansion, and restructuring of the American economy. The
food system was an integral part of that change, and
Northeastern agriculture and Massachusetts' agriculture were
dramatically affected by these changes. Preciptious
decline in agriculture occurred in all Northeastern states
after World War II. These declines were due-- among other
reasons-- to the creation of the interstate highway system,
the wide use of refrigerated tractor trailers, and the
integration of regional food distribution systems into a
national food distribution system. Between 1940 and 1974 the
number of farms in the ten Northeastern states decreased by
73% from 492,300 to 130,000. The decline in Massachusetts was
more extreme. In 1940 there were 31,900 farms, by 1974 there
10
were only 4,500 farms in the state, a decline of 86%. Loss of
farmland to other uses (suburban conversion) shows the same
trend. The ten Northeastern states lost 49% of their farmland
acreage between 1940 and 1974 from 47.9 million acres to 24
million acres. Massachusetts lost 68% of its farmland acreage
in those years declining from 1.9 million acres to .6 million
acres.
Why this dramatic decline in agriculture? Part of the
answer is the economic changes in the food business itself.
The major change was in the increasing integration of regional
markets into one national market. In the fresh produce sector
for example, Northeastern farmers had supplied a large part of
the region's needs. However, post war transportation
improvements led to increased food production in distant
states such as Florida and California. These areas also had
advantages because of their larger farm size, and much longer
growing season. A key part of the creation of a national
market involved centralization in the retail food business.
In the pos-twar years "super" markets grew rapidly and forced
independent stores out of business. As larger businesses than
independent stores they had more incentive to buy from large
commercial brokers who could sell them standarized food
products for more months of the year. The domination of a few
supermarket chains in each region was part of the creation of
a national market, as was the domination of production by large
Western farms. Monopolization in production and
monopolization in distribution were mutually reinforcing.
These developments had a major negative impact on the
11
economic viability of Northeastern farms. The growth of out of
region agriculture was not simply the working of an
unfettered, natural market. Out of region farms were larger
and in some ways more efficient than regional farms. But they
enjoyed some "unfair" advantages including government
subsidization of the highway system, unfair access of large
farms to water rights, and tax policy that rewarded investment
for "tax shelter". In addition to this, Northeastern farmers
did not control the regional marketing system. Major
Northeastern terminal markets (such as Chelsea Market, and
Hunts Point) and chain supermarkets began to sell produce that
the agribusiness farms were best at growing; uniformly packed,
graded products with brand name appeal due to advertising. If
local farmers had influenced the marketing system to sell what
they were best at growing; fresh, tasty, and diverse foods,
while moderating standarization the health of Northeastern
agriculture could be dramatically different today.
Another important post World War II change was
suburbanization. Suburbs grew rapidly after the war in large
part because of government land use and financial policies
(such as subsidized mortgages for homebuyers). Suburbs in the
United States grew at low densities and were based on auto
use. This suburbanization in conjunction with the economic
decline of farming led to the conversion of farms to housing
and other forms of spread development.6 Land use policy that
discouraged spread and preserved farmland and other valuable
land would have helped maintain a solid agricultural base in
the Northeast, while meeting housing needs.
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The cumulative effect of these trends was the precipitous
decline of farming in the Northeast. The affected states
began to react to this crisis in their agricultural sector.
Farmland preservation programs are being enacted or seriously
discussed in almost every Northeastern state. Farmland use
value assessment and agricultural districting--two of the most
used agricultural preservation strategies--have been initiated
in Maryland and New York.7 We will focus on the Massachusetts
program for purchase of development rights, an expensive, and
potentially powerful preservation strategy which with one
exception has only been enacted by states in the Northeast.
Within this region Maryland, New Jersey, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island all have
programs. So, in addition to a common agricultural economic
history, the Northeast has a shared political environment in
which to try to conciously restructure its agricultural
sector.
How can the state best intervene to "save farming" or
develop the states' agricultural potential. Answering this
requires understanding the reasons for the decline of
agriculture in Massachusetts. The reasons are economic. It
is difficult to make money farming in Massachusetts, not for
reasons peculiar to this state, but for reasons very similar
to those in other Northeastern states. In order to find
solutions we must understand the regional nature of the
agricultural problem.
The most powerful solutions to the region's severe
agricultural decline will emerge if the various states work
13
together to change the economics of farming in the Northeast.
Farming within the Northeast is more interdependent than
competitive. If agriculture doesn't survive in New Jersey and
New York it probaly won't in Maryland and Massachusetts.
Regional agricultural development will include all of the
states to different degrees, each producing what it is best
able to, and all supporting a regional marketing, and farm
infrastructure.
Preserving agriculture should be done offensively and
strategically. We shouldn't strive only to "save agriculture"
but to develop agriculture. This requires restructuring
Northeastern farming so the economics make sense. It requires
the integration of land preservation efforts with economic
programs to improve the "terms of trade" for farmers which
entails cooperation among the Northeastern states. Our focus
will be the purchase of development rights, a technique that
is viewed too often as a "land preservation tool" when it can
be used more broadly and effectively.
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CHAPTER THREE
PROGRAMS TO PRESERVE AGRICULTURE &
THE APR
The purchase of development rights is one of a handful of
major agricultural preservation programs. This chapter
reviews these other agricultural preservation programs;
differential tax assessment, agricultural districting,
transfer of development rights, and marketing. The
Massachusetts purchase of development rights program has
become the state's predominant agricultural preservation
program because it is the most powerful and permanent method
to save farmland. The other agricultural preservation
programs have with varying degrees of success been used in
conjunction with the APR program or not adopted.
Farmland assessment is a policy that assesses land in
agriculture preferentially. The goal of this preferential
treatment is to encourage farmers to remain in agriculture.
Land in agriculture, registered under the program is assessed
at its agricultural value rather than at market value. The
effect is to lower land taxes on farmers particularly in
areas experiencing development where land values are rising.
Maryland was the first state to enact differential assessment
for agriculture in 1956.8 Massachusetts passed its version
Chapter 61-A, the Farmland Assessment Act in 1972. By 1986
forty eight states had passed some version of this
legislation.9 Despite important benefits to farmers, lowering
land taxes is not powerful enough by itself to make farming
15
economically viable, particularly in the Northeast. Also the
program has no place-specific planning attributes. It doesn't
single out the best soils, or important areas of agricultural
production. For all of these reasons there was agreement
among Massachusetts agricultural advocates that additional
programs to Farmland Assessment were needed to preserve
agriculture.
Agricultural districting is another major land use
strategy. Agricultural districting entails the voluntary
creation by farmers of an agricultural zone for some legally
binding time period. This agricultural zone does not exclude
development, but rather sets the business climate for
agriculture. It provides benefits for farmers such as
eligibility for farm value tax assessment, maximum legal
protection from nuisance complaints of nonfarming neighbors,
and the right to ensure that public investment strategies are
reasonably congruent with the prime role of agriculture in the
district. This last right would affect public facilities such
as roads, sewage treatment facilities, and water systems. New
York pioneered agricultural districting in the early 1970's.
Since then a number of states have adopted this program as one
part of their overall strategy. Despite the benefits of
agricultural districts, foremost being to create a climate of
agricultural permanence, districting can only be part of the
solution, particularily in a densely populated state with a
modest farm sector such as Massachusetts. In fact,
agricultural districting legislation was not passed in
Massachusetts until 1985, and has not yet had any impact on
16
farming in the state.
Another farmland preservation program that has been used
on a county and municipal level is the transfer of development
rights (TDR). Transfer of development rights and purchase of
development rights (PDR) are based on the legal concept of
development rights as one part of the bundle of property
rights. Ownership includes the right to keep trespassers off
the land, the right to build or develop, and the right to sell
the property. Under TDR an owner in one part of the town or
county, can transfer her right to develop to another owner, in
a different location in the same town or county, where the
zoning has allowed "bonus" development. In effect, the zoning
system has created an area to be protected from development,
(in this case to preserve farming) and an area of higher
density development. Instead of simply zoning these areas,
the TDR approach allows the restricted landowner to be
compensated because she sells her development rights.
Furthermore, it is permanent because once she sells those
development rights, that land cannot be developed.
Transfer of development rights has many strong points.
It strengthens the overall ability of society to plan by
creating areas of development and protection. This allows for
agricultural uses and urban uses to complement each other, and
creates opportunities for integration of social goals
(agricultural preservation, inclusionary housing etc.). TDRs
reconceptualize our notion of property by removing some of
the generally accepted rights from ownership. When our notion
of property is challenged we can create other patterns of
17
development than our current one of inefficient, suburban
sprawl. Another strength of TDR is it "harnesses" the market
to social goals. This both allows for the costs of preserving
farmland to be shifted from the taxpayers, and creates
potential for more political support.
Despite these strong points, few schemes for agricultural
preservation have been successful in creating actively used
transferable development rights. No state government has
actively supported a TDR program to preserve agriculture. The
most successful use of TDRs has been on a county basis in
Montgomery County, Maryland. There a long democratic planning
process, clear consensus, and political will were able to
create an environment in which TDRs were extremely effective
in preserving agriculture.10 By early 1986 Montgomery County
had preserved over 5,000 acres without spending any public
money on land.11
Government units the size of counties are probaly most
effective in creating the necessary supply and demand for the
transfer of development rights to work. The market that
creates real estate values operates on a county or regional
level. Attempting to affect that market on less that a county
level is quite difficult. Since Massachusetts' tradition, and
New England's is one of strong municipalities and very weak
county governments, this creates major disadvantages in
enacting successful TDR programs to preserve agriculture. In
fact, neither the Commonwealth nor any county have seriously
considered such a TDR program. Several Massachusetts towns
have enacted TDR programs with agricultural preservation among
18
their goals. Despite this almost no farmland has been
preserved by these town based TDR programs.
The last agricultural preservation technique is purchase
of development rights. This program like TDR is based on the
"development rights" segment of the bundle of property rights.
In this case the development ~rights to a farm are purchased
by a state or county government to preserve farmland. The
farmer retains the other property rights, such as the right to
sell, or the right to keep trespassers off. The land has a
deed restriction put on it so that even if sold it is governed
by the same restriction. The primary strength of purchase of
development rights programs is they are powerful in halting
development, and permanent. The major weakness is they are
the most expensive of all the agricultural preservation
programs. For these reasons the states and counties -that have
approved purchase of development rights are in areas under
heavy development where buying development rights is seen as
the only way to save farmland. With the exception of Kings
County, (Seattle) Washington these programs have only been
e.nacted by states and counties in the Northeast. The
Massachusetts program to purchase development rights was
passed by the legislature in 1977. It was legislated as the
Agricultural Preservation Restriction (APR), and has become
the backbone of the state's strategy to preserve farmland. It
is one of the largest, and most influential development rights
programs in the country.12
Under the APR the development rights are purchased by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (sometimes with town
19
contributions). Purchase price is determined by appraising
the land for agricultural value, and market value and paying
the farmer the difference between the two amounts. In return,
the development rights are bought and the land is permanently
restricted from development. The farmer still owns the land
and can sell the farm, or do anything else associated with
property rights. If she decides to sell the farm, the
restriction is passed on to the new owner. As is the case
with land in which the developmant rights have been
transferred, the land's only value is for farming. Due to
this the market is significantly altered and land becomes
affordable to farmers. This solves one of the toughest
problems of agricultural viability, the problem of passing on
the land to young farmers. The state money also "frees up the
equity" in the land, that is, it allows the farmer access to
the value of her land (without developing) and creates the
possibility that she will reinvest in the farm.
The purchasing of development rights, along with the other
programs, farmland assessment, agricultural districting, and
transfer of development rights are the most common
agricultural preservation programs. The remaining chapters of
this paper will focus on the APR, the major Massachusetts
agricultural preservation program. Before doing this, it's
relevant to look at two other major programs the Commonwealth
created to restructure the economics of buying and selling of
farm products. Although these programs are not generally seen
as agricultural preservation programs they have everything to
do with perserving and developing agriculture in
20
Massachusetts. These programs are marketing and direct
marketing.
Marketing is a systematic method of selling a business,
products, or an idea to consumers. In this case the
Commonwealth was attempting to sell consumers (residents) the
idea that locally grown products were fresher and "better".
Many different tactics were used to reach this goal such as
sign advertising, point of purchase advertising, and radio
advertising.
The concept of direct marketing is more specific. It
involves producers selling "directly" to consumers, bypassing
the proverbial middleperson and thereby retaining a larger
share of the final value of the product. Direct marketing was
advocated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture during the
Carter administration -as a solution to the low prices that
farmers were receiving for their goods. The tactics of direct
marketing included forming producer cooperative links to
consumer cooperatives, producers selling to chain retail
stores (hence bypassing regional wholesale markets), farmers
markets in urban areas, roadside stands, and pick-your-own
operations. The concept of "bypassing" the middleperson is
romantic because middlepeople perform work that is essential,
particularly in our specialized and complex society. However
the strategy of producers gaining access to, and control of,
the knowledge and infrastructure of middlepeople (marketing,
distribution, advertising/education) is powerful, positive,
and workable.
The entire series of marketing initiatives involves the
21
creation of a positive image for Massachusetts grown products
("Mass Grown and Fresher") and the increase of the price for
locally grown products as well as the farmers share of the
price. These marketing initiatives change the "terms of
trade" between the agricultural producers and the urbanized
sectors of the economy by increasing prices paid to farmers.
Both marketing and direct marketing have been innovative and
successful in Massachusetts particularily in the fresh produce
sector of the economy.
Our interest with marketing stems from the belief that it
should be a major component to "preserving farmland" both in
the Northeast and in Massachusetts. Mark Lapping in his essay
"Farmland Protection in the Northeast" concludes with this
analysi-s:
Finally, the entire issue of farm economic
viability is beginning to get addressed through the state
level policy. The most encouraging sign in this regard
is a substantial shift in the posture of the region's
state agriculture departments: they have ceased to be
solely regulatory in nature and are moving to become
aggressive "boosters" of the region's agriculture. A
saying that reflects much conventional wisdom goes
something like this: there is nothing wrong with Vermont
agriculture which a few more dollars in the farmer's
pocket would not solve. Although this is surely an
oversimplification, it must be noted that methods to
retain a farmland base will be successful only to the
extent that they are part of a larger effort to enhance
the viability of the Northeast's agriculture. The
melding of policy, to join land concerns with economic
imperatives, is just beginning in the Northeast.13
Acheiving maximum positive results from agricultural
preservation programs requires this "melding" of land use
programs like the APR with marketing programs. Massachusetts
has created major programs in both of these areas. Getting
these programs to reinforce each other is not easy in part,
22
because of basic dilemmas the APR program faces.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DILEMMAS IN DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS
By July 4, 1985, 133 farms in Massachusetts with a
combined total of 12,288 acres had been restricted by the APR
program. To purchase the development rights of those 133
farms the state paid $20,232,700 for an average price per acre
of $1,647. How do we evaluate the Department of Food and
Agriculture's management of these resources? How do we
determine if the state has used this money wisely or not? We
will grapple with these questions first by examining the
stated goals and criteria of the APR program and secondly by
highlighting dilemmas that all purchase of development rights
programs have experienced. From this process key measures to
determine if the APR program is doing a good job will arise.
We will use these measures to evaluate the program in Chapter
Five.
GOALS AND CRITERIA FOR THE APR PROGRAM
The Department of Food and Agriculture (DFA) states that
the main objective of the Agricultural Preservation
Restriction program "is to protect productive farmland through
the purchase of deed restrictions and revitalize the
agricultural industry by making land affordable to farmers and
their operations more financially secure".14
The Department then goes on to state the goals of the
program:
1)To save the best and most productive agricultural land
remaining in the Commonwealth and;
2)To provide an opportunity for farmers to purchase
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farmland at affordable prices and;
3)To help farmland owners overcome estate planning
problems and to address other personal ownership problems
such as age, health, retirement and;
4)To release the equity "locked up" in the land and
therefore provide working capital to enable farm
operations to become more financially stable and;
5)If other program objectives are met, to protect
scenic openspace and environmentally sensitive land and;
6)To develop a positive attitude among farmers,
agribusinessman, landowners and urban residents that
agriculture in Massachusetts makes an important-
contribution to the state's economy, food supply and
rural character.15
These goals of the APR program have a mixed nature. Some
are important in setting policy and measurable while others
are less important, harder to measure, or in some cases true
almost by definition. For example, the first goal to "save
the best and most productive land" is important, clear ,and
measurable. This is the prime goal of the entire program. By
determining if the program has saved the best and most
productive agricultural land left in Massachusetts we can
evaluate whether the APR program has been successful in
reaching its prime goal. The second goal to provide
opportunities for farmers to purchase affordable farmland, and
the third goal to address personal ownership problems such as
retirement are very much related. These goals state that APR
program aims to help farms stay in production by assisting
farmers who want to r.etire and, by giving farmers an
opportunity to buy land at prices they can afford. We will
evaluate what effect the APR program has had on these
problems. The fourth goal is definitional in that any time
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the state purchases development rights, the equity "locked up"
in the land will be released without real estate development.
A more interesting question concerns the second part of that
goal; namely once the equity in the farm is released is that
equity reinvested in the farm operation? We will answer this
question in Chapter Five. The fifth program goal to protect
scenic openspace and environmentally sensitive land "after
other program objectives are met" is rather nebulous. It
indicates that the APR program neither wants to primarily
focus on preserving farms for scenic openspace reasons, or
alienate supporters who want the program to do just that. We
will not focus on this goal except to state the APR program
shou-ld not be an openspace preservation program, but a key
resource in a strategy to develop the state's agriculture.
The program's final goal to "develop a positive attitude among
farmers, agribusinessmen, landowners and urban residents"
concerning the importance of Massachusetts agriculture is both
hard to measure, and extremely important. This goal leads
directly back to our first chapter that argues for the
importance of preserving agriculture both for Massachusetts
farmers, and for the overall benefit of all of us. This paper
puzzles about how effectively the program has done this.
The APR program uses a list of criteria to decide which
farms to purchase development rights from. These criteria are
important because the program receives approximately twice as
many applications as it approves.16 The criteria for selection
of farms to buy development rights from also show a mix of
strongly mandated and more amorphous criteria: "The criteria,
0
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in order of significance, are (1) quality of the soils for
agricultural production; (2) degree of threat facing the farm;
(3) significance of the farm to the state's agriculture; and
(4) compatibility with environmental and community planning
objectives."17
As the goals of the APR program should reflect
objectives, the criteria for purchasing development rights
should reflect both objectives, and goals. The protection of
"prime" soils again heads the list of objectives, goals, and
criteria. The second criterion "degree of threat" refers to
protecting farms with the highest threat'of real estate
development. This criterion is problematic. In fact, it may
be in direct opposition to other goals and criteria of the APR
program. This is because reacting to the real estate market
is inherently defensive. It rewards farms that are
experiencing real estate pressure whether they are, productive
or whether their preservation is likely to help "revitalize
the agricultural industry". This is particularily problematic
in 1986 because the Boston metropolitan area, and most of the
state is undergoing real estate appreciation, and development
pressure of historic proportions. Even traditionally out of
the way areas such as Berkshire County in western
Massachusetts are experiencing housing increases of two and
threefold.18 The other criteria are more subjective and can
be interpreted in conflicting ways. For example, using the
third criterion, a farm may be considered "significant to the
state's agriculture" due to it's production characteristics,
or because of it's scenic or historical characteristics. The
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fourth criterion, compatibility with environmental and
community planning objectives is important in ensuring that
the state's agricultural preservation effort is part of the
overall planning objectives of the community and the state.
Agricultural preservation should be done in a democratic
context that opens up communities to housing for all races and
classes, and that helps us work with the natural environment.
This criterion is a necessary check on the APR program.
As interesting as the four criteria for selection of APR
farms are, the most interesting criterion is the one that is
missing. The APR program does not have as a criterion the
selection of farms that are productive or economically viable.
This despite the program's clear objective to not only protect
land that has "prime soils" but land that is productive. Two
questions emerge from this: has the committee that selects APR
farms been consciously choosing productive farms, and in
either case do the farms on the program represent the most
productive lands in the state? The second question whether
the state has protected the most productive land and
presumably most viable farms is key. We will follow it
throughout the remainder of this paper.
KEY DILEMMAS OF ALL PDR PROGRAMS
There are many recurring contradictory dilemmas to
purchase of development right programs. Each goverment body
that has purchased development rights has found.itself without
the resources to meet the goals. New Hampshire Commissioner
of Agriculture Steve Taylor brought out most of these dilemmas
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while speaking to a PDR workshop:
It really comes down to a political question that
our committee faces. Where can you spend that money?
Where can you spend it in the best, most responsible way?
There are those who say we should spend it in the
Connecticut Valley where farming is strongest and the
development pressures are the least and looking down the
road where agriculture will probaly survive in New
Hampshire. The other side is all those people who are
flocking to southeastern New Hampshire coming to find
what they think is the real rural life. There is
tremendous pressure to spend the money in that area, and
protect some agricultural land there. The reality is the
votes for the program are in the urban areas and the
populous southeastern part of the state. I guess our
best move is to spend the money evenly,. spread it over a
field like a great manure spreader.19
The first dilemma is that political support comes from
the suburbanized part of the state , but the best farmland is
generally in the more rural part of the state. This holds for
every state that has adopted PDR programs. To preserve
agriculture best might lead to protecting farms in the rural
areas. Doing this could lead to major political problems with
urban and suburban legislators. This is, in fact the prime
reason that Suffolk County, Long Island's PDR program has lost
political support and become defunct. The problem is greatly
exacerbated by appreciation in the real estate market. Land
under development pressure is both worth more and tends to
appreciate faster than land not under development pressure.
Not only do PDR programs feel political pressure to buy farms
that may not be in the "best agricultural area" they pay more
for that land by factors of two, five, or even tenfold.
Related to this is the question of whether the PDR
program is attempting to save the "land or the activity of
farming". All PDR programs save land, in most cases for
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perpetuity. But that land can be saved to grow food next
season, in two generations, or to maintain a scenic, historic
landscape. By looking at data from Massachusetts farms we can
begin to observe how effectively the state has preserved not
only the land, but the activity of farming.
Another question for PDR programs is whether it is
appropriate to plan blocks or clusters of farms which have been
preserved or to choose the restricted farms individually on
their own merits. Clustering brings up questions related to
maintaining the activity of farming, and political questions
of where to spend program money. Given the APR has decided to
go after farms in southeastern Massachusetts, as it has,
should it look for farms that directly abut already restricted
farms?
Most agricultural experts feel that clustering restricted
farms regionally, and locally is effective. This is because
regions that have numbers of farms are more likely to retain
"an agricultural infrastructure" and hence continue as
agricultural regions. States with PDR programs encourage or
require clustering to widely different degrees. Maryland, for
example, will only purchase development rights to farms that
have already enlisted in the state's agricultural districting
program and are therefore clustered.20 Massachusetts has no
written policy that favors clustering, but implicitly favors
clustering and is creating concentrations of preserved farms
in the Dartmouth-Westport area of southeastern Massachusetts
and the lower Connecticut Valley section of western
Massachusetts. Chapter Five will examine how the program has
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managed the dual pressures to spread and cluster APR farms.
A final dilemma for PDR programs is deciding to use more
scientific systems or committee managed systems to determine
which farms get chosen for the purchase of development
rights. New Hampshire, for example, uses a 100 point system
to rate farm applicants. Farms are rated for soils (30
points), development pressure (15 points), and economic
viability (10 points) among other attributes. The farms with
the most points are automatically chosen.21 Maryland uses a
similar point system that only kicks in after a large number
of farms have been restricted based on county planning
objectives, and "cheapness" of purchase price.22
Massachusetts, on the other hand, purchases development rights
based on the decision of the Agricultural Lands Preservation
Committee. This committee, consisting of farmers, experts,
state officals, and the Commissioner of Agriculture decides
which farms to appraise, and which farms to purchase
development rights from. They make their decision on the goals
and criteria previously discussed, and their evaluation of the
particular farm.
A committee managed system presents the possible
advantages of allowing more flexibility and innovation in the
growth of the program. A standarized scorecard is no
panacea. By itself it is probably no more objective or
scientific than a committee managed system. However using one
would force the Department to prioritize tradeoffs between
cost of development rights, geographic dispersal, agricultural
viability, and development pressure. This process could lead
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to discussion, disagreement and ultimately a more coherent
strategy to revitalize Massachusetts agriculture. This paper
recommends a "reconaissance point system" to prioritize farms
applying to the APR program based on objectives, goals, and
criteria of the program.23 The point system would be used as
a tool to aid the Agricultural Lands Preservation Committee in
reaching its decisions.
Based on the APR's program objectives, goals, and
selection criteria there are a number of questions to look for
in judging the programs success. The program like all
purchase of development rights programs faces major dilemmas
and has relatively little money and resources. These dilemmas
and constraints should be borne in mind when judging the -
program.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EVALUATING THE APR PROGRAM: CLUSTERING & ECONOMIC
VIABILITY
Chapter Four presented the objectives, goals, and
criteria of the Massachusetts APR program as well as dilemmas
that all development rights programs face. From the many
issues that surfaced from out of that process we want to
answer four questions about the APR program.
1) How does the APR program resolve the dual pressures
development rights programs face to cluster farms in
agricultural areas while spreading farms across the state?
2) How effective has the APR program been in creating an
affordable land market for farmers?
3) Are the APR funds paid to farmers being reinvested in
the farms?
4) Is the APR program preserving the "best and most
productive" lands in the state? How economically
viable are the farms on the APR program?
These four questions will not be given equal footing.
The question of spreading/clustering of APR farms is vital and
a potential landmine for all PDR programs, hence it deserves
attention. The questions of the APR effectiveness in creating
an affordable land market for farmers, and reinvestment of
APR monies are interesting, but not the major focus of this
paper. Finally determining whether the state has chosen
productive and economically viable farms is the central
question of this paper. Since neither productivity nor
viability became criteria for selecting APR farms there are
reasons to worry that the program may not be meeting this
objective.
0
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1) How does the APR program resolve the dual
pressures development rights programs face to cluster
farms in agricultural areas while spreading farms across
the state?
As discussed previously PDR programs feel political
pressure to preserve farms in all areas of the state. At the
same time they are under pressure to save land in the most
agriculturally productive areas of the state which by
definition are not in the populous parts of the state where
political support from the program comes from. How has the
Massachusetts APR program handled these dual pressures?
This question is best resolved by looking at where the
APR farms have been preserved. Map #1 shows the location of
all APR farms preserved between May 1980 when the first farm
was restricted, and March 1986. By this time a total of 159
farms and 14,805 acres were on the APR program. The map shows
that the activity of the program is spread throughout the
state yet certain counties and towns have major concentrations
(clusters) of preserved farms. A "cluster" is high
concentration of restricted farms all in close proximity.
These farms may directly adjoin, be in the same town or in
adjacent towns.
The four counties with the most farms on the APR program
are the adjacent counties of Hampshire, Worcester, Middlesex,
and Essex. These four counties have always had the most
program activity. The agricultural base of these counties
differs. Hampshire County contains what is commonly seen as
the best soil in Massachusetts, fertile Connecticut Valley
land. Farming operations there include tobacco, mixed
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vegetable,and dairy. Worcester County farms are predominantly
dairy operations and apple orchards. Middlesex County farms
are closer to, and more affected by the Boston metropolitan
area and its real estate market. Because of this there are
fewer surviving farms than in Worcester County, and those that
are in operation tend to be in fruits and vegetables because
of their higher returns per acre. Essex County also in the
Boston metropolitan area has a similar agricultural base as
Middlesex County.
Three interesting trends are clear. Within these four
counties there has been a major westerly movement in APR
activity in the last few years as land prices in eastern
Massachusetts have skyrocketed. Concurrent with this shift
has been the formation of a very strong "cluster" of preserved
farms in the Connecticut Valley. The most recent trend has
been the beginning of a strong clustering of APR farms in the
Dartmouth-We-stport area of southeastern Massachusetts. This
clustering will continue as there are a number of farms under
appraisal in that area.
Although the Agricultural Lands Preservation Committee
has no written policy to favor clustering, the staff and the
committee now have a "working policy" to encourage clustering
of APR farms. Remarks by Bureau of Land Use Chief Jim Alicata
attest to how strongly the Department encourages clustering:
What I've seen from evaluations that are presently
going on is they.'re looking at blocks of farms. I'm
presently involved in a project with seven farms
together. As long as we get all seven farms then we're
interested. I got a call yesterday about four farms
which make up maybe 1,000 acres total, and it's a
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really productive, very well managed area. So I
think those are the issues that have to be considered.
Because if the future of farming becomes lesser
number of farms, but larger farms then we should be
gearing ourselves towards that.24
Although the Department has evolved towards its present
"unofficial" policy of favoring clustering it has still
purchased development rights to farms throughout the
Commonwealth. Every county except Nantucket has at least one
farm on the program and most of the "non-major" counties have
between six and nine farms. In total 31% of the farms on the
program, a substantial minority are in the non-major counties.
The APR program has both preserved farms across the state and
clustered in key agricultural areas. This is an excellent
method to gain widespread political support, while preserving
enough land, human talent, and farm infrastructure to maintain
an agricultural base, and agricultural viability.
Information on the dispersal of bond money, and the
number of restricted farm acreage by county further shows how
well the Department has managed the clustering/spreading
dilemma. Graphs 1,and 2 illustrate the total acreage
under APR, and the amount spent for purchase of development
rights, for each Massachusetts county. These graphs show that
the APR program has preserved farms across the state, but has
focused on four counties in particular. They also point out
the vast difference in real estate value between land in
western Massachusetts and land in eastern Massachusetts. By
clustering in agricultural areas and spreading to preserve
farms everywhere, even at a high price, the APR program has
enjoyed ongoing support both from legislators and farmers.
GRAPH #2
Acres Under APR By County
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FARM VISITS
The- rest of this chapter will rely on information
gathered during the summer of 1985 to the 133 farms on the APR
program as of July 4, 1985. These visits were primarily to
ensure that the farms were in compliance with the terms of the
deed restriction. As a secondary purpose the Department interns
Rink Dickinson and Jim Grimley gained a wide array of
information about the farms, their operations, and the
opinions of the growers on important agricultural issues.
The interviews were informal and ranged in length from
fifteen minutes to two hours. All farmers were asked the same
questions although the interviewers felt free to let the
conversation roam, hence the widely varying interview time.
Questions covered included size of farm, number of acres in
different crops, length of time under the restriction, resale
of farm since restriction, marketing arrangements, number of
employees, gross farm income, and recommendations for what the
Department could do to best help Massachusetts farmers. In
addition to these questions the interviewers rated each farm
on soil management, and overall management. Finally the
interviewers verified that every farm was in compliance with
the agricultural restriction. It is a strong postive
endorsement of the program that there were no violations.
2)How effective has the APR program been in creating an
affordable land market for farmers?
This question stems from the second and third goals of
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the APR program and from the stated objective of "making land
affordable to farmers". Farmers were asked if there had
been a change in owner or operator of the farm since the farm
was put under restriction, or last inspected which ever was
more recent. Only forty nine percent of the farms had the
same owner and operator as when they went under the
restriction. Thirty percent of the farms had a new owner and
new operator. The remaining twenty one percent had changed
owner or operator, but not both.25 Given that no farm has yet
been under the agricultural restriction for more than six
years this is a tremendous amount of real estate activity.
The fact that much of it was "non-market" or family
transactions is further to the APR program's credit as one goal
of the program is to solve retirement issues, and it can be
safely assumed that most of these transactions allowed the
older generation of farmers the income to retire while still
leaving a farm for the younger generation.
The personal stories of farmers on the program also
attest to the state's success at creating an affordable land
market. Many growers stated "without it (the APR) I wouldn't
be here now". This is particularily true due to the rapidly
rising real estate market.
It's clear that the APR program is creating an affordable
land market for farmers and that it is helping many growers
with their ownership and retirement problems. A relevant
question is how many opportunities there are for farmers to
purchase land besides the APR program. Bill King,
agricultural expert and former director of the APR program
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believes that there are essentially no instances in which
agriculture can compete with other uses for land in
Massachusetts. According to King, farmers can only afford land
that is not suitable for development (i.e. flood plains), that
has an agricultural restriction on it, or has been sold by a
concerned farmer for agricultural value. The conclusion
follows that the APR program accounts for a significant
percent of farmer land purchases. The program deserves high
marks for creating an affordable land market for Massachusetts
farmers. Despite this, a new problem is emerging because of
the escalation in Massachusetts real estate. That is the
possibility that farmers will not be able to afford APR farms
in some areas because they will-be outbid by "gentry" looking
for mini-estates, and horse farms. To the Department's credit
they are aware of this, and are striving to keep APR farms
from country gentlemen.
3) Are the APR funds paid to farmers being reinvested
in the farms?
A goal of PDR programs is to "release the equity" in the
land so that farmers can reinvest in their operations, plan
for the future and ultimately "revitalize agriculture".
Getting information on what the farmers have done with the APR
capital infusion is difficult because people who get large
sums of money (the program mean as of July 1985 was $152,125)
generally don't tell the state what they've done with that
money.
Our approach was to ask the question in as general a way
as possible. From this we were able to get responses from 67
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out of 119 farmers and landowners (56%) concerning use of APR
money they received. The question was was "what was the major
use of the APR funds?" Our most common answers were that the
money was used for; working capital to reinvest in the farm,
debt repayment, retirement, and investment. In cases where
farmers responded that the money had been used for more than
one purpose we noted all purposes. Because of this there were
88 responses from the 67 farmers and landowners. Results
follow:
10
TABLE 3 USE OF APR FUNDS
# Responses % of Total
1)REINVESTMENT IN FARM 27 31%
2)DEBT REPAYMENT (Mortgage etc.) 23 26%
3)RETIREMENT 21 24%
4)INVESTMENT 16 18%
5)CREATION of NEW ENTERPRISE 1 1%
Total 88 100%
We should use this information carefully. Most of the
farmers and landowners knew that the Department of Food and
Agriculture wanted to hear the APR funds had been reinvested
in the farms. The survey therefore had an inherent bias to
prove reinvestment in APR farms as a major use of APR funds.
Despite this, there.was no reason for farmers to invent
imaginary uses of the money, rather just to include farm re-
investment if it was a use of their money.
We can safely conclude that the major uses of APR funds
are for farm reinvestment , debt repayment, and retirement.
What can't be determined is how much of the money goes for
each of these uses. For our purposes 'we see them as roughly
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of equal importance. The other significant use of APR money
was for investment. Generally this meant the farmer or
landowner left the principal untouched and used the interest
either for working capital, for personal income, or
retirement.
In any case this information shows that the APR monies
are being used in ways that meet the goals of the program.
Cases where the money is reinvested in the farm directly meet
the programs goals to "free up the equity in the land" so it
can be used by the farmers. Similarly when farmers pay off
debts they are gaining control over their agricultural
enterprises, and adding to the stability of agriculture in
Massachusetts. Of course, it's possible to pay off debts, but
continue to work for such low returns that farmers will decide
to get out of farming simply because of low income, low
morale, and a sense of low social esteem, rather than absolute
financial crisis. The same issue reappears in many cases
where the APR monies are used for retirement.
The Simone farm in Metheun is a good example of this.
The Simones have one of the most interesting farms on the APR
program. Frank and Bill Simone run a small, (twenty acre)
intensive vegetable farm. They run the farm with their six
sons. They specialize in "quick" growing crops such as
lettuces, escarole, and of all things radishes. They are one
of the few, if not the only major radish growers in
Massachusetts. All of their products are marketed wholesale
and like most farmers they feel they don't receive a fair
price for their products. By selling their development rights
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to the Commonwealth for $160,000 Frank and Bill will be able
to retire securely. Their sons in their twenties and thirties
will take over the operation. The APR program has been
extremely successful in keeping this highly productive farm
going, but if produce prices remain low will the younger
Simones remain in agriculture? Furthermore if they leave
farming they will not be able to sell their land for
development, and repay themselves for years of underpaid,
backbreaking work. So the APR program has solved the Simones
retirement problem and kept some great land productive, for
now. Without agricultural development the problem will
reappear.
Our data shows that direct reinvestment of APR funds back
into the farms is occurring, and that the other major uses of
APR monies are in line with the programs goals. Again the APR
program scores high marks. It's now time to evaluate the
productivity and economic viability of APR farms because it on
this goal more than any other that the long range success of
the program depends. Our analysis of Northeastern agriculture
has been that unless the economics of farming is restructured
agricultural land preservation will not succeed. The Simones
radish farm exemplifies this. The APR program has done an
excellent job in selecting and working with the Simones. The
result is a highly productive farm, on excellent soils, run by
a hard working family has been "preserved". This is an
opportunity. Without more creative work it will become a
problem probably in ten or fifteen years. Ten years is a
sufficient length time to plan further strategies to develop
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agriculture in Massachusetts. If most farms are anywhere near
as viable as the Simones, the APR program can only be judged an
overwhelmingly success.
4) Is the APR program preserving the "best and most
productive" land in Massachusetts? How economically
viable are the farms on the APR program?
Preserving the best and most productive land in
Massachusetts is the overall objective and prime goal of the
APR program. Our thesis question is has the APR program
preserved productive and economically viable farms? We are
not explicitly concerned with whether the land on the program
is the "best". The best lands are those that have the "soil
qualities, growing season, and moisture supply needed to
economically produce sustained high yields of crops when
acceptable farming methods are utilized".26 To determine
which farms to purchase rights from, the staff and committee
use soil classification information. To evaluate how effective
the APR program has been at saving the best lands would entail
looking at soil maps to see what percent of APR farmland is
"prime". This is not our focus first because of lack of
interest, and secondly because it is not necessary. The APR
staff and the Agricultural-Lands Preservation Committee do
look at soil maps, and at soil classification information when
making decisions on whether to appraise, or purchase
development rights to farms. There is little doubt the
program successfully protects farms with prime and highly
rated soils.
One reason the program does this well is the criteria for
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selection of APR farms gives top billing to protecting farms
with "quality of soils for agricultural production". As
discussed in Chapter Four there is no criterion for
"agricultural productivity" despite that being an objective
and goal of the APR program. Furthermore there is no mention
of economic viability as a criterion although it is discussed
obliquely in the programs objectives. This leads to two
questions. Does the staff and committee have an "unofficial
policy" of selecting farms based on productivity and
viability, and in either case are APR farms productive and
viable when compared to Massachusetts farms as a whole?
Bob Woodruff, APR Program Director states that the
program does have a policy of looking for farms that are
productive and looking for operations that are well managed,
and viable. Although farms are not specifically evaluated on
productivity and viability Woodruff feels there is an
increasing effort on the committee's part to get farms that
are productive. Also, Woodruff feels that earlier on in the
program's history the better farms tended not to apply to the
program, for fear of stigma attached to being part of a
government program. As the program has gained a positive
reputation there has been an increase in applications from
good and productive farms.27
Three measures that begin to get at at economic viability
are agricultural productivity, gross farm income, and risk of
failure. Productivity is a precondition for viability,
although to be viable a farm needs to be more than productive.
How much food and agricultural product do APR farms produce
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each year and how much income do APR farmers receive for their
products? It is difficult to get solid numbers on the
agricultural productivity of each APR farm. The interns did
question each grower about the variety of crops and the
average yields per acre for each crop. The answers were
vague, perhaps because the farmers were hesitant to be judged
for their productivity.
The growers did however, answer questions about their
gross farm income. Of the 133 farms, farmers and landowners
for 119 parcels answered the full range of questions. of
these 119 respondents, 77 (or 65%) provided information on
gross farm income. The farmers were asked to estimate their
income within $5,000. The interns are convinced that the
farmers responses were accurate and meaningful. More than
one farmer offered to "go and get the books" and some answered
the question to the nearest hundred dollars. In one case a
farmer told us his income to the exact penny!
Gross income measures the total sales of the farm. It
does not take expenses into account, hence tells us little
about profit. Finally it doesn't tell. us personal income of
the farmer. It does however give us a -good estimate of farm
productivity.
Are APR farms more or less productive than farms in
Massachusetts in general? To answer this we will compare the
productivity (measured by gross income per acre) for the APR
farms that provided information, to the productivity per acre
for all farms in Massachusetts as measured by the Census of
Agriculture.
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From this information we will be able to conclude if the
APR farms are more or less productive than Massachusetts
farms. However productivity is not viability. Economic
stability or conversely risk is key in measuring viability.
Are APR farms more or less stable than the average farm in
Massachusetts? This is a much more slippery subject than that of
mere economic productivity. Our focus will be on the dairy
industry, an agricultural sector that is in major stress
nationally and within Massachusetts. By measuring the
percentage of APR farms that are dairy farms in comparison to
the percentage of dairy farms in Massachusetts in general, we
can see to what extent the Commonwealth is "invested" in the
least stable major farm operation in the state. This will
tell us something about the assumed stability of APR farms.
Before examining statistics on APR farm productivity,
there is a more subjective survey on this question. One of
the key questions interns Rink Dickinson and Jim Grimley
addressed in their report on APR farms was whether "the land
was being used to a reasonable degee of its potential?" The
interns concluded that 7% of the restricted farms were not
being used to a reasonable degree of their potential. The
farms in this category were selected on the basis of the
intern's subjective assessment. This assessment however was
based on visits to the sites and relatively extensive tours of
the land under restriction. Farms that were judged
unproductive were either growing and marketing no crops, or
more generally consisted of fields of hay with little tending.
What does it mean that 7% of the APR farms "were not
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being used to a reasonable degree of their capacity"? It
means a small but not inconsequential number of the restricted
farms were not productive. Farms in this category are not
necessarily "mistakes" of the program. As the deed
restriction runs for perpetuity there reasonably will be times
when one generation of farmers is still on the farm, yet no
longer active. Major problems do exist for the effectiveness
of the program when restricted farms have been purchased in
areas where there is little agricultural activity, and little
farm infrastructure such as with the Bresse farm discussed in
Chapter One. It would 'be useful to track these farms with
little agricultural activity over time to determine what
proportion of them are mistakes.
As previously mentioned interviews were conducted with
farmers/landowners of 119 of the 133 farms on the APR program
in June of 1985. Seventy seven farmers gave the interns their
gross farm income. Generally this was for the last year with
complete sales information or calendar year 1984. The farmers
were asked to estimate within $5,000 and were asked for the
income that represented a normal year. If they had an
abnormal year (for example because of hail damage to apples)
they would answer the question with income for sales for a
normal year.
Another note on procedure. Many APR farms, particularly
those in dairy rent a great deal of land. This obviously
jeopardizes the long term security of their operations.
Beyond that, it presents some problems in allocating the
market production of their operation. A typical dairy farm
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may use 300 acres to grow the corn and hay for the cows. Many
of the APR dairy operations have 100 acres or so under
restriction and rent the rest. If the total income from milk
sales is $250,000 only some part of that production can be
allocated to the land under the agricultural restriction.
This study divides the production proportionally. So in this
example we would credit one third or $83,300 of production to
the APR farm.
Massachusetts total receipts from farm sales for 1984 was
$385 million. Total receipts means income received by farmers
for their agricultural production.28 Total Massachusetts farm
acreage in 1985 was 680,000 acres of which 12,288 acres had
development rights purchased by the state.29 Restricted farms
in June 1985 accounted for 1.8% of the Commonwealth's farm
acreage. The farms that gave detailed information of gross
income covered 7,698 acres or 1.1% of Massachusetts farm
acreage. On those 7,698 acres of preserved farmland the total
receipts from agricultural products was $4,749,875 for 1984.
Our group of APR farms that responded with gross farm income
information accounted for 1.2% of total Massachusetts farm
receipts. Table 4 shows this information. APR farms that
provided information on gross income therefore accounted for
1.1% of the Commonwealth's land and 1.2% of the Commonwealth's
total agricultural receipts. Therefore APR farms are more
productive than Massachusetts farms overall. When we
translate this information into average income per acre APR
farms that gave income information averaged $617 in output per
acre while farms in Massachusetts in general averaged $566 per
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acre.
TABLE # 4
13
PRODUCTIVITY PER ACRE OF APR FARMS AND MASSACHUSETTS FARMS
All APR Farms APR-Gross Inc.Farms Mass. Farms
1)#Acres 12,288 7,698 680,000
2)% Total 1.81% 1.13% 100.%
Ag.Land
3)Gross Income $4,749,875 $385,000,000
4)% Total 1.23% 100.%
Gross Income
5)Gross Income $617 $566
/Acres
It is a positive sign that APR farms are more productive
than Massachusetts farms in general. Why are the APR farms
more productive? Part of the answer is the committee has
selected farms that are good and productive operations.
Furthermore farmers who go through the somewhat arduous
process of applying for development rights are deeply
committed to farming and will tend to run operations that are
more productive than normal. Most importantly the statistics
on Massachusetts agriculture reflect the murky definition of
farm as a place where more than $1,000 of agricultural
products are sold.30 The statistics reflect the large number
of "farms" with income of less than $10,000 (56%) in the
state. These operations are generally not full time farms,
and as such are not the type of operations the APR program
seeks to preserve.
Our information on APR viability thus far is Dickinson
and Grimley's findings that 7% of APR farms were not being
used to a reasonable degree of their potential, and results
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from over half the APR farms representing 1.1% of the state's
total farmland that indicate that APR farm acreage is engaged
in more economic activity than Massacusetts farm acreage in
general. This bodes well for the program although one would
expect a state program with choice of which farms to purchase
development rights to to be able to protect farms that are
"better that average". However these findings indicate that
the APR program is succeeding in purchasing development rights
to farms that generate more market economic activity and
therefore have a greater ability to be economically viable.
The next question is what degree of risk do APR farms
face compared to Massachusetts farms in general? Even if APR
farm acreage is more economically productive than the mean
farm acreage in Massachusetts it is critical to try to
understand if APR farms are more or less risky and prone to
bankruptcy than the "average" farm in Massachusetts. We will
attempt to get to this information by examining what
percentage of farms under development rights are dairy
operations, compared to the general Massachusetts farm
profile.
Our argument is that due to market conditions dairy
operations are under tremendous financial stress nationally,
and in Massachusetts. Currently in 1986 dairy farms are more
prone to financial failure than other agricultural
enterprises. In five years the crisis may be in apple
orchards or sweet corn farms. What is important about dairy
farms is how they represent farms under stress, and how these
farmers "at the margin" interact with the APR program.
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Due to "improvements" in technology dairy cows produce
more milk than they did twenty years ago. These improvements
are expected to continue, more being on the immediate horizon.
The ability of farmers to produce milk has greatly surpassed
the growth in consumer demand for the product. Prices have
not only not kept pace with inflation but in some years gone
down in absolute terms. Farmers in this price squeeze have
attempted to make their money by producing even more milk.
They have succeeded in this. The overall result has been an
economic war of attrition to see which producers can survive
by producing large quantities of milk at maximum efficiency.
The weakness of the dairy industry and the inability of
the government to solve the problems of this agricultural
sector in which it is heavily involved in, through regulating
prices, can by seen by recent the "whole herd buyout" program.
This program has just taken effect as of the spring of 1986.
Under it the federal government has bought out hundreds of
dairy farmers to get them out of milk production. The dairy
cows are sent to slaughter (causing an oversupply of beef
cattle). The farms and the farmers have to stay out of
dairying for five years. The goal is to limit production,
boost prices, and halt the low price- overproduction cycle.
Few believe it will work primarily because cows are simply
producing more milk that ever before. The importance of the
whole herd buyout program for Massachusetts is it shows the
difficulties in creating policies to help the state dairy
industry when it has no control on dramatically more powerful
federal policy.
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The numbers on the Massachusetts dairy industry speak for
themselves. Table 5 is from the Department of Food and
Agriculture's 1985 report on agriculture in Massachusetts. It
shows that from 1975 to 1985 Massachusetts lost dairy farms
every year. In that ten year period the state went from
nearly 1,000 dairy farms to slightly less than 700.
Production of milk for this ten year period did not follow the
same trend however. It tended to fluctuate from year to year
with a sustained low point from 1978 to 1981. Production of
milk in 1985 was greater than in 1975. Not surprisingly, the
Department's forecasts for the dairy industry are more of the
same. The Department projects a loss in dairy farms every
year between 1985 and 1990. According to these projections in
the year 1990, there will be fewer than 600 dairy farms in the
state producing more milk than in any year between 1975 and
1989.31
The "shakedown" in the dairy industry has important
consequences not only for the future of Massachusetts
agriculture, but for the development rights program as well.
If the APR program is proportionally more dairy than
Massachusetts agriculture in general, and the dairy business
faces a future of low prices, overproduction, and bankruptcy
for dairy farmers, the APR program may have the effect of
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DECLINE IN MASSACHUSETTS DAIRY FARMS
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prolonging the misery of the most marginal farmers instead of
revitalizing agriculture in the state.
Table 6 displays information on the number and
percentage of dairy farms in Massachusetts, and on the APR
program. Unlike the question of gross farm income the
information on type of farm operation reflects the population
of all APR farms. Of the 133 farms which had development
rights purchased the interns saw the land, and talked to the
owners or operators for 119 parcels. Each of these 119
parcels have been placed in a category for type of farming
operation. This information on farm category displayed in
Table 6 compares the population of Massachusetts farms with
the population of APR farms. It is not necessary to ask
whether differences noted between the APR farms are
statistically significant. The pertinent question becomes
what is the meaning, or policy implications of the differences
observed?
TABLE SIX COMPARISON OF MASSACHUSETTS FARMS AND APR FARMS
BY FARM CATEGORY
MASSACHUSETTS FARMS APR FARMS ON RECORD
Source 1982 Census Source Farm Visits
of Agriculture
CATEGORY # Farms % # Acres % # Farms % # Acres %
1)Dairy 781 14.5% 214,011 35% 52 43.5% 6,191 55%
2)Field 731 13% 100,156 16% 24 20% 1,679 15%Crops
3)Live- 1,101 20% 109,259 18% 3 2.5% 346 3%Stock
4)Poultry 176 3% 8,237 1% - - - -
5)Vegetable 650 12% 39,252 7% 17 14% 1,369 12%6)Fruits 769 14% 84,410 14% 13 11% 952 9%
7)General 251 5% 26,919 5% 6 5% 604 5%
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8)Animal 407 8% 17,272 3% 2 2% 95 1%
Spec.
9)Nursery 535 10% 13,464 2% 2 2% 57 .5%
TOTAL 5,401 612,980 119 11,253
The left hand side of- the chart analyzes farm operations
by nine distinct functions or categories. These categories
are the used by the U.S. Census of Agriculture and include
dairy farms, vegetable farms, field crops, cash grains, and
"general" farms. Under the dairy classification for example,
we see that there were 781 dairy farms in Massachusetts in
1982 out of a total of 5,401 farms. Accordingly 14.5% of the
state's farms were dair farms. Further to the right the
chart shows those dairy farms accounted for 214,011 acres (of
the state's 612,980) or fully 35% of Massachusetts farm
acreage. Are there more dairy farms on the APR program
proportionally than in the state of Massachusetts in general?
By examining the information on "APR Farms on Record" we
can answer this question. Fifty two of the 119 farms that
responded were dairy farms. That results in 43.5% of the APR
farms being dairy farms as opposed to 14.5% of the farms in
the state overall. Similarily 55% of the APR acreage was in
dairy operations as opposed to 35% of the state's agricultural
acreage. What do these figures mean?
They mean that the APR program is heevily invested in
dairy operations. The percentage of dairy farms on the
program is 30% above the normal expected from the state's
agricultural profile. More importantly fully 55% of APR
acreage is devoted to dairy operations, well above the 35% of
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Massachusetts farm acreage that is in dairy. Why are there so
many dairy farms that have sold their development rights to
the Commonwealth?
It is easy to understand why dairy farms would be
interested in selling development rights to the state given
the crisis in the dairy sector. Dairy farmers are hurting
economically, and their morale is low. Many see little future
in dairying yet know no other life. Understandably farmers in
financial crisis who want to remain in farming will be very
attracted to the APR program. The tendency to attract dairy
farmers in distress who want to stay in farming is exaggerated
by another factor. It is a widespread belief among farmers
that the APR program does not pay fair market price for
development rights. This perception affects the programs
ability to attract some growers. Many of the farmers on the
program who felt they were paid less than was fair, accepted
the offer either because of their strong support for the
program's goals, or because they were in financial crisis.
Given the belief among farmers that the program should pay
more for development rights, and that most farmers would
rather keep their financial options open, it follows that the
program would attract economically distressed farmers who want
to stay in agriculture. Finally because of the depressed milk
market a disproportionate number of farmers in this position
in 1986 are dairypeople.
The APR program is preserving prime agricultural land,
and land that is productive. Furthermore the program is
putting even more emphasis on preserving productive farms.
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However these positive actions are mitigated by the program's
heavy overemphasis on restricting dairy farms. This
overinvestment is risky and may threaten the APR's ability to
meet its objective to "revitalize the agricultural industry".
It is the Department of Food and Agriculture's mission to
use the APR program to accomplish many goals that round out
that objective. Doing this requires some coherent strategy to
capitalize on the power of purchasing development rights to
create positive multiplier effects. Purchasing development
rights to an abnormal number of dairy farms may reflect such a
strategy. If it does, that strategy should be articulated,
debated, tested and strengthened.
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CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FINAL THOUGHTS
The Massachusetts Agricultural Preservation Restriction
program is a success. The program's goal to preserve
farmlands has broad and deep political support. That the
Department staff and Agricultural Lands Preservation Committee
have been able to make difficult decisions about how to
allocate the program's scarce resources while maintaining
overall political support and farmers support is a major
accomplishment. The success of the APR program shows that
government can engage in value based planning that works, and
that conscious policy to intervene to solve agricultural and
food dilemmas can be successful. The program staff and
committee have much to be proud of.
Evaluating their work we see the following strengths and
weaknesses.
STRENGTHS
1) The program has saved over 15,000 acres of prime farmland
forever. This is wise in the short term and is a potentially
extremely valuable future food resource.
2) The program has been very successful at preserving farms
across the Commonwealth while protecting large blocks of land
in the most important agricultural areas.
3) The farmland preserved by the APR program is more
productive ($ per acre) than Massachusetts farmland in
general.
4) The APR program is clearly creating an affordable land
market for Massachusetts farmers, and helping them solve
ownership and retirement problems.
5) Farmers receiving APR funds seem to be reinvesting these
monies in ways to improve their farming operations.
WEAKNESSES
1) The APR program is overinvested in dairy farming, that is
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there are many more dairy farms on the program than is normal
given the Massachusetts farm profile. This is a problem
because of the long term decline in the dairy industry.
Furthermore it highlights the program's tendency to attract
farmers at the margins of solvency who want to remain on the
land.
2) The limited resources and reactive nature of "preserving
agriculture" have hindered long term planning. Despite many
program successes planning will improve the programs chances
of reaching its objectives.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1) Experiment with a "reconnaissance point system" to evaluate
farms applying for the program. This system would work like
New Hampshire's point system, except the committee would only
use the information to help make their decisions. They would
retain all decision making powers.
2) Update the programs criteria for farm selection to better
reflect the programs objectives and goals, and to reflect
changes in policy since the program's birth. The criteria
should reflect that productive farmsand farms near other APR
farms are given.preference.
3) Decide it is agricultural preservation policy to favor
dairy farms for purchase of development rights, or severely
limit new dairy acceptances until the program reflects the
state's agricultural profile. Good planning requires seeing
the unpleasant. The economic decline of dairying in
Massachusetts is a very powerful trend. The APR program must
conciously create a strategy to preserve Massachusetts farms
to revitalize agriculture given this crisis in the dairy
industry.
4) Engage in long range planning about possible directions for
Massachusetts agriculture, and how to use the APR program to
produce the positive economic impacts to help create that
future.
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON FARM PRESERVATION
This concludes our analysis of the major Massachusetts
program to preserve agriculture. Our interest in that program
has sprung from beliefs about both the meaning of working. the
land and the broader than Massachusetts strategies to
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redevelop agriculture.
No state agricultural preservation strategy can acheive
more than limited success. Only by organizing on a regional
level can Northeastern agriculture gain the economic clout,
market, and land base to flourish. Poor access to markets and
bad terms of trade are the key problems to solve. The most
powerful action the Northeastern states could take to revive
their agriculture would be to create a regional marketing
program with regional advertising, and a Northeast label.
Each of the states would agree to promote regionally grown
food when and if it was available. While creating this focus
farmers would need to organize to influence the markets and
work with city people and consumers in the region on creating
balanced development between country and city.
This process can easily sound idyllic. It is a powerful,
positive, and spiritual goal to connect those who work the
land with those who are quite removed from the land. People
who work the land, respect, and are humbled in that creative
endeavor with nature are keeping all of us in contact with the
natural world. Eating their food, and seeing their 'farms
makes that material and spiritual connection even stronger.
As positive and idyllic as our vision of this connection
to farmer, land, and food can seem there is another side to
it. As Winifred Bresse says "If you don't have farmers you
don't have food"!32 Food provides spiritual nourishment. It
is also real , material, and necessary for survival. To be
politically unable to get adequate food to millions of people
in a society as wealthy as ours shows the dark side of not
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solving the land and food problems. For if land is a
commodity, food too must be one, and those who can't buy it
simply will not live. A system that runs on such principles
cannot survive. If that system is not changed we too will not
survive. In the words of Karl Polyani describing the end
result of a system that treats land and labor as commodities:
For the alleged commodity 'labor power' cannot be shoved
about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without
affecting also the human individual who happens to be the
bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of a man's
labor power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the
physical, psychological, and moral entity 'man' attached to
that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural
institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of
social exposure: they would die as the victims of acute
social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and
starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements,
neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted,
military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and
raw materials destroyed.33
Polyani's words written in the mid 1940's, haunt, for
they too accurately describe our society. To solve these
problems requires starting with the basics. Food is as basic
as one can get. Maintaining farms, and our connection to the
land gives us hope and vision even while changing some of the
irrationality and inhumanity in our world.
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